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Abstract
Deep leaning models have been used widely
for various purposes in recent years in ob-
ject recognition, self-driving cars, face recog-
nition, speech recognition, sentiment analysis
and many others. However, in recent years
it has been shown that these models possess
weakness to noises which forces the model to
misclassify. This issue has been studied pro-
foundly in image and audio domain. Very
little has been studied on this issue with re-
spect to textual data. Even less survey on this
topic has been performed to understand differ-
ent types of attacks and defense techniques. In
this manuscript we accumulated and analyzed
different attacking techniques, various defense
models on how to overcome this issue in order
to provide a more comprehensive idea. Later
we point out some of the interesting findings of
all papers and challenges that need to be over-
come in order to move forward in this field.
1 Introduction
From the beginning of the past decade, the study
and application of Deep Neural Network DNN)
models have sky-rocketed in every research field.
It is currently being used for computer vision
(Buch et al., 2011; Borji et al., 2014), speech
recognition(Deng et al., 2013; Huang et al., 2015),
medical image analysis(Litjens et al., 2017; Shen
et al., 2017), natural language processing(Zhang
et al., 2018; Otter et al., 2020), and many more.
DNNs are capable of solving large scale com-
plex problems with relative ease which, tends to
be difficult for regular statistical machine learn-
ing models. That is why in many real-world ap-
plications, DNNs are used profoundly and explic-
itly. In a study by C. Szegedy(2013) showed that
DNN models are not that robust in the image do-
main. They are in fact, quite easy to fool and can
be tampered in such a way to obey the will of an
adversary. This study caused an uproar in the re-
searcher community and researchers started to ex-
plore this issue in other research areas as well. Dif-
ferent researchers worked tirelessly and showed
that DNN models were vulnerable in object recog-
nition systems (Goodfellow et al., 2014), audio
recognition(Carlini and Wagner, 2018), malware
detection (Grosse et al., 2017) and sentiment anal-
ysis systems (Ebrahimi et al., 2017) as well.
The number of studies of adversarial attacks
and defenses in the image domain outnumbers
the number of studies performed in textual data
(Wang et al., 2019a). In Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP), for various applications like sen-
timent analysis, machine translations, question-
answering, and in many others, different attacks
and defense have been employed. In the field of
NLP, Papernot (2016) paved the way by showing
that adversarial attacks can be implemented for
textual data as well. After that, various research
has been performed to explore adversarial attacks
and defense in the textual domain.
Adversarial attacks are a security concern for all
real-world applications that are currently running
on DNNs. It is the same scenario for NLP as well.
There are many real-world programs launched,
which is based on DNNs like sentiment analy-
sis (Pang and Lee, 2008), text question-answering
(Gupta and Gupta, 2012), machine translation (Wu
et al., 2016), and many others. Users in the phys-
ical world use these applications in their lives to
get suggestions about a product, movies, or restau-
rant or to translate texts. An example of the adver-
sarial attacks is shown in figure 1. An Adversary
could easily use attack techniques for ill-will and
provide wrong recommendations and falsify texts.
Since these attacks are not observed by the mod-
els due to the lack of robustness these programs
would lose values. Thus, the study of adversarial
attacks and defense with respect to text is of ut-
most importance.
For textual data this topic has not been explored
that much but for image domain it has been ex-
ar
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Figure 1: Adversarial attacks on image and audio data
(Gong and Poellabauer, 2018)
plored much more. Since this topic hasnt been
explored that much small number of publications
about it has been found and smaller number of
review works have been done. We were able
to go through three review papers related to this
topic (Belinkov and Glass, 2019; Xu et al., 2019;
Zhang et al., 2020). In the manuscript of Be-
linkov (2019) they mainly studied different anal-
ysis in NLP, visualization and what type of infor-
mation neural networks capture. They introduced
adversarial example as to explain that traditional
DNN models are weak. Xu (2019) explained ad-
versarial examples in all domains i.e. image, au-
dio, texts etc. It was not specialized for text but
mostly related to image domain. Zhang (2020) in
their manuscript described different publications
related to adversarial examples. Unfortunately it
was focused largely on attack strategies and shed
little light on defense technique. They mainly dis-
cussed data augmentation, adversarial training and
one distillation technique proposed by (Papernot
et al., 2016). A table is shown below that com-
pares our review with others.
In this review our major contributions can be
summarized as follows.
• We provide a systematic analysis and study
of different adversarial attacks and defense
techniques which are shown in different re-
search projects related to classification, ma-
chine translations, question-answering and
many others.
• We present here adversarial attack and de-
fense techniques by considering different at-
tack levels.
• After going through all the research works we
have tried to answer which attack and defense
Text
Domain
Attacks Defense
Belinkov(2019)
Partly
*****
*
Xu(2019)
Zhang(2020)
Fully
**
Ours ****
Table 1: Comparison with recent surveys. (No. of stars
represent how much that topic is discussed)
technique has the advantage over other tech-
niques.
• Finally, we present some exciting findings af-
ter going through all the research works and
point out challenges that need to be overcome
in the future.
Our manuscript is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2 we start by providing preliminary informa-
tion about adversarial machine learning with re-
spect to both image and textual data. Here we also
provide classification of different attack and de-
fense approaches as well. Following this in section
3 we discuss about various attack techniques based
on the taxonomy presented in section 2. In or-
der to defend models from these attack techniques
we discuss about different defense techniques in
section 4. We provide an in depth discussion of
our findings in these topics and some challenges
in section 5. We conclude our manuscript by pro-
viding conclusion in section 6.
2 Adversarial Machine Learning
Modern machine learning and deep learning has
achieved a whole new height because of its high
computational power and fail proof architecture.
However, recent advances in adversarial training
have broken this illusion. A compelling model can
misbehave by a simple attack by adversarial exam-
ples. An adversarial example is a specimen of in-
put data that has been slightly transformed in such
a way that can fool a machine learning classifier
resulting in mis-classification. The main idea be-
hind this attack is to inject some noise to the input
to be classified that is unnoticeable to the human
eye so that the resulting prediction is changed from
actual class to another class. Thus we can under-
stand the threat of this kind of attack to classifica-
tion models.
2.1 Definition
For a given input data and its labels (x, y) and a
classifier F which is capable of mapping inputs x
to its designated labels y in general case we can
define them as F (x) = y. However, for adversar-
ial attack techniques apart from input data a small
perturbation δ is also added to the classifier F .
Note that, this perturbation is imperceptible to hu-
man eyes and it is limited by a threshold ||δ|| < .
In this case the classifier is unable to map it to the
original labels. Hence, F (x+δ) 6= y. The concept
of imperceptiblity is discussed in length in section
5.2.
A robust DNN model should be able to look be-
yond these added perturbation and be able to clas-
sify input data properly. i.e. F (x+ δ) = y.
2.2 Existence of Adversarial Noises
Since adversarial examples have been uncovered,
a growing and difficult question have been loom-
ing over the research community. Why adversarial
examples exist in real life examples. Several hy-
pothesis have been presented in an attempt to an-
swer this question. However, none of them have
achieved a unanimous agreement of the overall re-
searcher community. The very first explanation
comes from C. Szegedys own paper (2013). In
it he says that adversarial examples exists due to
the fact that there are too much non-linearity and
the network is not regularized properly. Opposing
to this hypothesis I. Goodfellow says that it ex-
ists because of too much linearity in the machine
learning and deep learning models (2014). Various
activation functions that we use today like ReLU
and Sigmoid are straight lines in the middle parts.
He argues that since we want to protect our gradi-
ents from vanishing or exploding we tend to keep
our activation functions straight. Hence, if a small
noise is added to the input because of the linearity
it perpetuates in the same direction and accumu-
lates at the end of the classifier and produces miss-
classification. Another hypothesis that is present
today is called tilted boundary (Tanay and Grif-
fin, 2016). Since the classifier is never able to fit
the data exactly there are some scope for the ad-
versarial examples to exist near the boundaries of
the classifier. A recent paper argues that adver-
sarial examples are not bugs but they are features
and that is how deep neural networks visualize ev-
erything (Ilyas et al., 2019). They classified the
features into two categories called robust and non-
robust features and showed that by adding small
noises non-robust features can make the classifier
to provide a wrong prediction.
2.3 Classification of Adversarial Examples
Here, we provide a basic taxonomy of adversarial
attacks and adversarial defense techniques based
on different metrics. For adversarial attack tech-
niques we can classify different attacks based on
how much the adversary has knowledge about the
model. We can divide it into two types.
• White-Box Attacks: In order to execute these
type of attacks the adversary needs to have
full access to the classifier model. Using
the model parameters, architectures, inputs
and outputs the adversary launches the at-
tack. These types of attacks are most effec-
tive and harmful since it has access to the
whole model.
• Black-Box Attacks: These attacks represent
real life scenarios where the adversary has
no knowledge about the model architecture.
They only know about input and output of the
model. In order to obtain further information
they use queries.
We can classify attacks based on the goal of the
adversary as well. We can classify it into two type.
• Non-Targeted Attack: Adversary in this sce-
nario doesnt care about the labels that the
model produce. They are only interested
in reducing the accuracy of the model. i.e.
F (x+ δ) 6= y.
• Targeted Attack: In targeted attacks the ad-
versary forces the model to produce a spe-
cific output label for given images. i. e.
F (x+ δ) = y∗.
These are the general classifications of different
attacks. However for NLP tasks we can classify
attacks differently. Since the data in text domain
is different to the data in the image or audio do-
main attack strategy and attack types are some-
what different. Based on which components are
modified in text we can classify attack techniques
into four different types. They are called character
based attacks, word level attacks, sentence level
attacks and multi-level attacks. In these adver-
sarial attacks text data are generally inserted, re-
moved, swapped/replaced or flipped. Though not
all of these options are explored in different levels
of attacks.
• Character Level Attack: Individual charac-
ters in this attack is either modified with new
characters, special characters and numbers.
These are either added to the texted, swapped
with neighbor, removed from the word or
flipped.
• Word Level Attack: In this attacks words
from the texts are changed with their syn-
onyms, antonyms or changed to appear as a
typing mistake or removed completely.
• Sentence Level Attack: Generally new sen-
tences are inserted as adversarial examples in
these types of attacks. No other approach has
been explored yet.
• Multi-Level Attack: Attacks which can be
used in a combination of character, word and
sentence level are called multi-level attack.
Figure 2: Adversarial attacks classification
Adversarial defense techniques have been stud-
ied in mainly three directions (Akhtar and Mian,
2018). They are
• Modified Training/Input: In these cases the
model is trained differently to learn more ro-
bust features and become aware of adversar-
ial attacks. During testing inputs are also
modified to make sure no adversarial pertur-
bation is added to it.
• Modifying Networks: By adding more layers
or sub-networks and changing loss or activa-
tion functions defense is sought in this sce-
nario.
• Network Add-on: Using external networks
as additional sections for classifying unseen
data.
Reference Attack-type Application
Ebrahimi(2018)
White-box
and
Black-box
Machine
Translation
Belinkov(2017) Black-box
Machine
Translation
Gao(2018) Black-box Classification
Li(2018)
White-box
and
Black-box
Classification
Gil(2019) Black-box Classification
Hosseini(2017) Black-box Classification
Table 2: Character-level attack type with applications.
3 Adversarial Attacks
Most of the literature is about attack techniques
that is where we start our discussion. In this sec-
tion we will be analyzing different attack tech-
niques published in recent years in details. In or-
der to provide a clear understanding we are diving
our explanations based on the taxonomy for the
NLP that we mentioned in section 2.
3.1 Character Level Attack
As mentioned before character level attacks in-
cludes attack schemes which try to insert, mod-
ify, swap or remove a character, number or special
character. Ebrahimi (2018) in his paper worked
with generating adversarial examples for charac-
ter level neural machine translation. They pro-
vided white and black box attack techniques and
showed that white-box attacks were more damag-
ing than black-box attacks. They proposed con-
trolled adversary which tried to mute a particular
word for translation and targeted adversary which
aimed to push a word into it. They used gradi-
ent based optimization and in order to edit the text
they performed four operations insert, swap two
characters, replace one character with another and
delete a character. For black box attack they just
randomly picked a character and made necessary
changes.
Belinkov (2017) worked with character based
neural machine translation as well. In their pa-
per they didnt use or assume any gradients. They
relied on natural and synthetic noises for generat-
ing adversarial noises. For natural noises they col-
lected different errors and mistakes from various
datasets and replaced correct words with wrong
ones. In order to generate synthetic noises they
Figure 3: Example of character-level attack(TEXTBUGGER) (Li et al., 2018)
relied on swapping characters, randomized char-
acters of a word except the first and last one, ran-
domized all the characters and replaced one char-
acter with a character from its neighbor in the key-
board.
Another black-box attack was proposed by Gao
(2018). They worked with enron spam emails and
IMBD dataset for classification tasks. Since, in the
black-box settings an adversary doesnt have ac-
cess to gradients they proposed a two-step process
to determine which words are the most significant
ones. Temporal score and temporal tail scores are
to be calculated to determine the most significant
word. This approach was coined as DEEPWORD-
BUG by the authors. To calculate temporal score
they checked how much effect each word had on
the classification result. Temporal tail score is the
complement of temporal scores. For temporal tail
score they compared results for two trailing parts
of sentences, one had a particular word and an-
other didnt had it.
TEXTBUGGER is both a white-box and black-
box attack framework that was proposed by Li
(2018). For generating bugs or adversarial exam-
ples they focused on five kinds of edits: insertion,
deletion, swapping, substitution with visually sim-
ilar word, substitution with semantically similar
meaning. For white-box attacks they proposed two
step approach. The first step is to determine which
words are most significant with the help of deter-
mining Jacobian matrix. Then generate all five
bugs and choose the one which is the most opti-
mal for reducing accuracy. In order to generate
black-box attacks in this framework they propose
three step approach. Since, there is no access to
the gradient thus they propose to determine first
which sentence is the most important one. Then
determine which word is the most significant and
finally generate five bugs for it and choose which
one is the most optimal.
Gil (2019) was able to transform a white-
box attack technique to a black-box attack tech-
nique. They generated adversarial examples from
Reference Attack-type Application
Papernot(2016) White-box Classification
Samanta(2017) White-box Classification
Liang(2017)
White-box
and
Black-box
Classification
Alzantot(2018) Black-box Classification
Kulesov(2008) White-box Classification
Zang(2019) Black-box Classification
Table 3: Word-level attack type with applications.
a white-box attack technique and then trained a
neural network model to imitate the overall pro-
cedure. They transferred the adversarial examples
generation by HotFlip approach to a neural net-
work. They coined these distilled models as DIS-
TFLIP. Their approach had the advantages of not
being depended on the optimization process which
made their adversarial example generation faster.
Perspective is an api to detect toxicity in com-
ments which is built by Google and Jigsaw. Hos-
seini (2017) showed that it can be deceived by
modifying inputs. They didnt have any calculated
approach, mainly modified toxic words by adding
a dot (.) or space between two words, or swapping
two characters and thus they showed the api got
lower toxicity score than before.
3.2 Word Level Attack
Papernot (2016) was the first one to generate ad-
versarial examples from texts. They used com-
putational graph unfolding technique to calculate
the forward derivative and with its help the Jaco-
bian. It helps to generate adversarial examples us-
ing FGSM technique. The words they choose to
replace with are chosen randomly so the sentence
doesnt keep original meaning or grammatical cor-
rectness.
To change a particular text classification label
with the minimum number of alteration Samanta
(2017) proposed a model. In their model they
Figure 4: Example of word-level attack (Alzantot et al., 2018)
either inserted a new word or deleted one or re-
placed one. They at first determined which words
are highly contributing to the classifier. They de-
termined a word is highly contributing if remov-
ing it changes the class probability to a large ex-
tend. To replace the words they created a candi-
date pool based on synonyms, typos which pro-
duce meaningful words and genre specific words.
They changed a particular word based on the fol-
low conditions.
if Word is an adverb and highly contributing
then
remove it
else
Choose a word from the candidate pool
if the word is an adjective and candidate word
is adverb
then
Insert
else
replace particular word with candidate
word
end if
end if
Liang (2017) proposed a white-box and black-
box attack strategy based on insertion, deletion
and modification. To generate adversarial ex-
amples they used natural language watermarking
technique (Atallah et al., 2001). In order to per-
form white-box attack they provided a concept
of Hot Training Phrase (HTP) and Hot Sample
Phrase (HSP). These are obtained with the help
of back-propagation to get all the cost gradients
of each characters. HTP helps to determine what
needs to be inserted while HSP helps to determine
where to insert, delete and modify. For black-box
attacks they borrowed the idea of fuzzing tech-
nique (Sutton et al., 2007) for implementing a test
to get HTPs and HSPs.
In order to preserve syntactical and seman-
tic meaning Kuleshov (2008) took the inspira-
tion from thought vectors (Bengio et al., 2003;
Mikolov et al., 2013) which mapped sentences to
vectors. Those who had similar meanings were
placed together. To ensure semantic meaning they
introduce syntactic constraint. Their approach was
an iterative approach and in each iteration they re-
placed only one word with their nearest neighbor
which changed the objective function the most.
Genetic algorithm based black-box attack tech-
niques is proposed by Alzanot (2018). They tried
to generate adversarial examples which were se-
mantically and syntactically similar. For a partic-
ular sentence they randomly select a word and re-
place it with suitable replacement word which fits
to the context of the sentence. For this they calcu-
late the first few nearest neighbor words accord-
ing to the GloVe embedding space. Next using
Googles 1 billion words language model they try
to remove any words which do not match the con-
text. After that they select a particular word which
maximizes the predication. This word is then in-
serted into the sentence.
An improvement of the genetic algorithm based
attack was proposed by Wang (2019b). They mod-
ified it by allowing a single word of a particular
sentence to be changed multiple times. In order to
ensure that the word is indeed a synonym of the
original word it needs to be fixed.
A sememe based word substitution method
based on particle swarm optimization technique
was proposed by (Zang et al., 2019). A sememe
is the minimum semantic unit in human language.
They argued that word embedding and language
model based substitution methods can find many
replacements but they are not always semantically
correct or related to the context. They compared
their work with (Alzantot et al., 2018) attack tech-
nique and showed their approach was better.
Reference Attack-type Application
Jia(2017)
White-box
and
Black-box
Question
Answering
Wang(2018) White-box Classification
Zhao(2017) Black-box
Natural
Language
Inference
Cheng(2019) White-box
Machine
Translation
Micheal(2019) White-box
Machine
Translation
Table 4: Sentence-level attack types with applications.
3.3 Sentence Level Attack
In the domain of question answering Robin Jia
(2017) introduced two attack techniques called
ADDSENT and ADDANY. They also introduced
two variants of these ADDONESENT and ADD-
COMMON randomly. Here, ADDONESENT is
a model independent attack i.e. black-box attack.
Using these attacks they generated an adversarial
example which does not contradict the original an-
swer and insert it at the end of the paragraph. To
show effectiveness of ADDSENT and ADDANY
they used it on 16 different classifiers and showed
that all of them got reduced F1 score.
There is another group of researchers named
Yicheng Wang (2018) who have worked on mod-
ification of AddSent model. They proposed two
modification of AddSent model and named their
model as AddSentDiverse. Basically AddSent
model creates fake answers that are semantically
irrelevant but follows similar syntax as question.
In AddSentDiverse, they targeted to generate ad-
versarial examples with higher variance where dis-
tractors will have randomized placements so that
the set of fake answers will be expanded. More-
over, to address the antonymstyle semantic per-
turbations that are used in AddSent, they added
semantic relationship features enabling model to
identify semantic relationship among contexts of
questions with the help of WordNet. The paper
shows that AddSentDiverse model beats AddSent
trained model by an average improvement of
24.22% in F1 score across three different classi-
fiers indicating an increase in robustness.
Zhao (2017) Proposed a new framework uti-
lizing Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
on Stanford Natural Language Interface (SNLI)
dataset to generate grammatically legible and nat-
ural adversarial examples that are valid and se-
mantically close to input and can detect local be-
havior of input by searching in semantic space of
continuous data representation. They have imple-
mented these adversaries in different applications
such as image classification, machine translation
and textual entailment to evaluate the performance
of their proposed approach on black-box classi-
fiers such as ARAE ( Adversarially Regularized
Autoencoder), LSTM and TreeLSTM. By their
work, they have proved that their model is suc-
cessful to generate adversaries that can pass com-
mon sense reasoning by logical inference and de-
tect vulnerability of Google Translate model dur-
ing machine translation.
Cheng (2019) worked with neural machine
translation and proposed a gradient based white
box attack technique called AdvGen. Guided by
the training loss they use a greedy choice to find
the best solution. They also used language model
into it as well because it is a computationally easy
approach for solving an intractable solution and it
also retains somewhat semantic meaning. Their
research paper is based on using adversarial ex-
amples for both attack generation and using these
adversarial examples to improve the robustness of
the model.
Michael(2019) worked with neural machine
translation as well and in their manuscript they
proposed a natural criterion for untargeted attacks.
It is adversarial examples should be meaning pre-
serving on the source side but meaning destroy-
ing on the target side. From it we can see that
they are focusing on the point about preserving
the meaning of the sentences while pushing adver-
sarial examples into it. They propose a white-box
attack using the gradients of the model which re-
places one word from the sentences to maximize
the loss. To preserve the meaning of the sentences
they used KNN to determine top 10 words which
are similar to a given word. This approach has the
advantage of preserving the semantic meaning of
the sentence. They allowed swapping characters
to create a substitute words but if the word is out
of the vocabulary then they repeated the last char-
acter to generate the substitute word.
3.4 Multi-level Attack
HotFlip is a very popular, fast and simple at-
tack technique which was proposed by Ebrahimi
Figure 5: ADDANY and ADDSENT Attack Generation (Jia and Liang, 2017)
Reference Attack-type Application
Ebrahimi(2017) White-box Classification
Blohm(2018)
White-box
and
Black-box
Question-
Answering
Wallace(2019) White-box
Classification,
Question-
Answering
Table 5: Multi-level attack types with applications.
(2017). This is a white-box gradient based attack.
In the core of the attack lies a simple flip operation
which is based on the directional derivatives of
the model with respect to one-hot encoding input.
Only one forward and backward pass is required in
order to predict the best flip operation. This attack
can also include insertion and deletion as well if
they are represented as character sequences. After
estimating which changes ensures highest classifi-
cation errors a beam search algorithm finds a set of
manipulations which works together to ensure the
classifier is confused. Their original manuscript
was on character level adversarial attack but they
also showed that their approach can be extended
to word level attack as well. Since flipping a word
to another has the possibility of losing its original
value they flipped a word only if it satisfied certain
conditions. They flipped a word if the cosine sim-
ilarity of the word embeddings were higher than
a given threshold and if they were members of the
same parts of speech. They didnt allow stop words
to be removed.
On the topic of question answering system
Blohm (2018) implemented word and sentence
level white-box and black-box attacks. They
started by achieving state of the art score on the
MovieQA dataset and then investigate different at-
tacks effect.
• Word-level Black-box Attack: For this type
of attacks the authors substituted the words
manually by choosing lexical substitutions
which preserved their meanings. To ensure
the words were inside of the vocabulary they
only switched words which were included in
the pretrained GloVe embeddings.
• Word-level White-box Attack: With the help
of the attention model they used for classi-
fication they determined which sentence and
which word was the most important one. This
had a huge impact on the prediction results.
• Sentence-level Black-box Attack: Adopting
the strategy of ADDANY attack proposed by
(Jia and Liang, 2017) they initialized a sen-
tence with ten common English words. Then
each word is changed to another word which
reduces the prediction confidence the most.
• Sentence-level White-box Attack: Similar to
the word-level white-box attack they target
the sentence which has the highest attention
i.e. the plot sentence. They removed the plot
sentence to see if the classifier was indeed fo-
cusing on it and its prediction capability.
Wallace (2019) proposed a technique in which
they added tokens at the beginning or ending of a
sentence. They attempt to find universal adversar-
ial triggers which are optimized based on white-
box approach but which can also be transferred
to other models. At the very beginning they start
by choosing trigger lengths as this is an impor-
tant criteria. Longer triggers are more effective
but more noticeable than shorter ones. In order
to replace the current tokens they took inspiration
from the HotFlip approach proposed by (Ebrahimi
et al., 2017). They showed that for text classifi-
cation tasks the triggers caused targeted errors for
sentiment analysis and for reading comprehension
tasks triggers can cause paragraphs to generate ar-
bitrary target prediction.
4 Adversarial Defense
As mentioned earlier most of the researchers fo-
cused on attacking DNN models in the field of
NLP few focused on defending it. Here we divide
our studied manuscripts into two section one be-
ing the most common approach called adversarial
training found in (Goodfellow et al., 2014). In the
second section we include all the research papers
that try to tackle attacks by working on a specific
defense technique.
4.1 Adversarial Training
Belinkov (2017) in their experiments showed that
training the model with different types of mixed
noises improves the models robustness to differ-
ent kinds of noises. In the experiments of Li
(2018) they also showed for TEXTBUGGER at-
tack adversarial training can improve models per-
formance and robustness against adversarial ex-
amples. In the experiments of Zang (2019) they
showed that their sememe based substitution and
PSO based optimization improved classifiers ro-
bustness to attacks. By using CharSwap during ad-
versarial training on their attack Micheal showed
that adversarial training can also improve the ro-
bustness of the model. Ebrahimi (2017) in their
manuscript of HotFlip also performed adversarial
training. During their testing phase they imple-
mented beam search which wasnt used for training
hence the adversary in the training wasnt strong as
the testing ones. This reflects in their adversarial
training experimental results as well. Though af-
ter training with adversarial examples the model
attains certain robustness its accuracy isnt as high
as the original testing because of the above men-
tioned reason.
4.2 Topic Specific Defense Techniques
One of the major problems with adversarial train-
ing is that during training different types of attacks
need to be known. Since, adversaries dont publi-
cize their attack strategies adversarial training is
limited by the users knowledge. If a user tries
to perform adversarial training against all attacks
known to him then the model would not be able
to perform classification properly as it would have
very low information on the original data.
In the research work of Alzanot (2018) they
found that their attack approach which was based
on genetic algorithm was indifferent to adversar-
ial training. A good reason for this would be that
since their attack diversified the input so much ad-
versarial training had no effect on them.
To protect models from synonym based attack
techniques Wang (2019b) proposed synonym en-
coding method (SEM) which puts an encoder net-
work before the classifier model and checks for
perturbations. In this approach they cluster and
encode all the synonyms to a unique code so that
they force all the neighboring words have similar
codes in the embedding space. They compared
their approach with adversarial training on four
different attack techniques and showed that SEM
based technique was better in synonym substitu-
tion attack method.
Adversarial spelling mistakes were the prime
concern of Pruthi (2019) in their research work.
Through their approach they were able to han-
dle adversarial examples which included insertion,
deletion, swapping of characters and keyboard
mistakes. They used a semi character based RNN
model with three different back-off strategies for
a word recognition model. They proposed three
back-off strategies pass-through, back-off to a
neutral word, back-off to background model. They
tested their approach against adversarial training
and data augmentation based defense and found
out that ScRNN with pass-through back-off strat-
egy provided the highest robustness.
A defense framework was proposed by Zhou
(2019) to determine whether a particular token is
a perturbation or not. The discriminator provides
some candidate perturbations and based on the
candidate perturbations they used an embedding
estimator to restore the original word and based
on the context using the help of KNN search. The
authors named this framework as DISP. This dis-
criminator is trained on the original corpus during
training time for figuring out which one is the per-
turbation. Token of the embedding corpus is fed
to the embedding estimator to train it and recover
the original word. During the testing phase the
discriminator provides candidate tokens which are
perturbations and for each of the candidate pertur-
bation the estimator provides an approximate em-
bedding vector and attempts to restore the word.
After this the overall restored text can be passed
to the model for prediction. To evaluate their
frameworks ability to identify perturbation tokens
they compared their results against spell check-
ing technique on three character level attacks and
two word level attacks. Results show that their
approach was more successful in achieving bet-
ter results. To test robustness of their approach
they compared against adversarial training, spell
checking and data augmentation. Their approach
was able to perform in this experiment as well.
5 Discussion
We will be providing a discussion on some of the
interesting findings that we found while studying
different manuscripts. We are also going to shed
some lights on the challenges on this area.
5.1 Interesting Findings
Based on the papers that we had studied we sum-
marize and list out here some interesting findings.
• Character-level Perturbations: It can be as-
tounding to find that changing a single char-
acter can affect the models prediction. Hos-
seini showed that adding dots(.) or space
in words can be enough to confuse perspec-
tive api(Hosseini et al., 2017). Not only
this in HotFlip we have seen that the authors
swapped a character based on the gradients to
fool the model. So, while designing defense
strategies a mere character level manipulation
needs to be considered as well.
• Research Direction: From the papers that we
studied we found out that most of the pa-
pers were based on different attack strategies.
Very few papers were focused on defending
the model. Same can be said for multi-stage
attacks as well. Only a few researchers pro-
duced manuscripts for multi-stage attacks.
• Adversarial Example Generation: Through
the studies of different manuscripts we found
that in order to generate adversarial examples
most of the researchers followed a two-step
approach. The first being finding out which
word was the most significant in providing
prediction and the second step was to replace
it with suitable candidates that benefit the ad-
versary.
5.2 Challenges
In our study we found several challenges in this
field. They are mentioned below.
• This phenomenon was first found in exis-
tence in the image domain and it has gained
a lot of attention. Many research works have
been published on it. It can be an easy as-
sumption that we can use it in text domain as
well. However, there is significant difference
in them. In the image domain the data is con-
tinuous but text data is discrete. Hence, the
attacks proposed in image domain cannot be
utilized in text domain.
• Another limitation of textual data is the con-
cept of imperceptibility. In the image do-
main, the perturbation can often be made
virtually imperceptible to human perception,
causing humans and state-of-the-art models
to disagree. However, in the text domain,
small perturbations are usually clearly per-
ceptible, and the replacement of a single
word may drastically alter the semantics of
the sentence and be noticeable to human be-
ings. So, the structure of imperceptibility is
an open issue.
• Till now there is no defense strategy that is
able to handle all different types of attacks
that were mentioned here. Each defense strat-
egy worked on a single type of attack ap-
proach. For example for spelling mistakes
we can use the defense technique proposed
by (Pruthi et al., 2019). For synonym based
attacks we can use SEM model. A unified
model which can tackle all these issues have
not been proposed yet.
Task Dataset Reference
Classification
IMBD, SST-2, MR, AG News,
Yelp Review, DB-pedia,
Amazon Review, Trec07p,
Enron Spam Detection
Gao(2018), Li(2018), Ebrahimi(2017),
Kulesov(2008),Samanta(2017), Zang(2019),
Liang(2017)
Machine Translation
Ted Talks parallel
corpus for IWSLT2016,
LDC corpus, NIST,
WMT’14
Ebrahimi(2018), Belinkov(2017),
Cheng(2019), Michel(2019)
Natural Language
Inference
SNLI Alzantot(2018), Zang(2019), Zhao(2017)
Question-Answering SQuAD, MovieQA Jia(2017), Blohm(2018)
Table 6: Dataset used by different researchers for attack generation
• The concept of universal perturbation has still
not been introduced in respect to textual data.
In image domain researchers established a
method which was able to generate a single
perturbation that can fool the model.
• Whenever a new attack technique is pro-
posed researchers use different classifiers and
datasets as there is no benchmark. From ta-
ble 6 we can see for a particular application
different datasets are used no ideal dataset is
being used for attack generation. Since there
is no benchmark it is not easy to compare dif-
ferent attack and defense strategies with each
other. Lacking of such benchmark is a big
gap in this field of research.
• There is no standard toolbox which can
be used to easily reproduce different re-
searchers’ work. There are many toolbox
which can be used in the image domain like
cleverhans (Papernot et al., 2018), art (Nico-
lae et al., 2018), foolbox (Rauber et al., 2017)
etc but there is no standard toolbox for text
domain.
6 Conclusion
In this review we discussed about adversarial at-
tack and defense techniques with respect to tex-
tual data. Since the inception of adversarial exam-
ples it has been a very important research topic for
any aspects in deep learning applications. DNNs
perform very well on standard dataset but perform
poorly in the presence of adversarial examples.
We tried to present an accumulated view of why
they exist, different attack and defense strategies
based on their taxonomy. Also we pointed out sev-
eral challenges which can be tended to for getting
future direction about research works in the future.
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